an impossible view
“a growing number of applications have benefited from the use of ontologies as a means to achieve semantic interoperability among heterogeneous, distributed systems.” – chainbi, “An Agent Intentional Structure based on Cooperation Ontology”
we develop our expectations of otherness always in a sense incorrectly…to miss the mark. to induce disappointment? can we dispense with expectation in true embrace of the real impossible? is this but a new expectation (to expect the impossible)? accept me as i am, how is one to find this, am. is am always also its expectation and demand…
expect me here in sound, as in sand, slipping past. the audio is here———-> impossible
–
i am interested in how judgment is different from evaluation. their difference relates to the possible and impossible relation…
and we will see that judgment leads us to disappoint, and evaluation to a frustrated expectation.
it might be that the gaze complicates this difference…
the gaze is without and after. the gaze is inside and holding. it incorporates both subject and others.
as it is, like with am, that the gaze is also its mark. that is, the am and the gaze and all is what it is and what it is not. even judgment, but judgment only is as it forgets this negativity within it.
and so the gaze marks us as it is us. this is expectation in a sense (in the sense). in space-sense.

"have the focal points of gray matter start their motion every time their feel and vision of them inside you starts moving." artaud
but the inevitable frustration of this expectation of spaced-sense of otherness first of all occurs. as otherness is always reaching beyond me and my sense. as they are mine; and even though i might think of otherness as “one” and particularly mine, it is grander than titles can demarcate. some times an other will dance with me, and lead me to symmetrical moves–moves that are not mine but a mirror of me and mine. this similitude can last long and disappear in a moment. some times an other works to mark herself to battle me. we find each other across enemy lines. but the white flag is waved and the illusion is changed at a breath in time. these findings, plottings, ploddings of otherness are approximate. estimations to help us in sense, so that we may see some thing to lend the scenery to our leap out of the plane. the way otherness exists is within and after space. it is an energy more invisible than the gaze. in potential, it is pure multiplicity.
the very multiplicitous nature of otherness is our freedom. echoed by sartre, nietzsche, many, this freedom anew creates a significant difference to unhinge the death-drive implication of expectation and disappointment. we can see the difference arise in wordplay of traces, in comparing the words that we use for the swing that misses (i.e. frustration and disappointment). in vain, the etymology of frustration, and for disappointment, to un-settle. frustration is ontological, while disappointment is teleological–a finality amidst other finalities. but there is a tension, as between ontology and epistemology there might be. we do not know how to begin often without the scenery lent.
we are frustrated but let this not always be a disappointment. we can wish sisyphus as smile in his work up the hill. to disturb order is good; to disappoint is a form of resistance to the regime of should. but the toil that is undertaken in all respects in vain does not withhold from us a feeling of calm and love. this is the very point that cannot be disrupted. when we open ourselves to the impossible, we cannot be disappointed. we are in flux.
and so our evaluation need not involve disappointment at all. disappointment will always follow judgment. but in evaluation, nothing is settled at the start. there is an intensity that swells for no one and yet brightly still. the judgment presumes, indeed requires a universal evidentiary system of pointing; whereas evaluation is mine without relying on justification outside of it.
the living flesh as the ultimate instantiation of an evaluation with out a judgment.
artaud writes in “situation of the flesh,” “i don’t separate my thought from my life. with each vibration of my tongue i return over the paths of my thought to my flesh.” flesh is “above all is the essence of the nerve.” we do expect in/as ultimate immanence. deleuze and guattari define immanence in //what is philosophy?// as “that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought” (59). it is a plane in which our structures fail us. the way our mathemes abut our movement. let us feel closer to the pulse of movement itself than to fixate on the limits of control. if we treat flesh as otherwise, we are dead.
//to be disappointed//
the law calls us to judge. the judgment must always lie to itself–that it is separating the subject (judge) and other. the epistemological insistence of separation unfolds ultimately always to a disappointment. our system of pointing fails us. in //paul’s new moment// davis reads the law as lack and fragmentation. under it, we are always already guilty. before the law, the presumption of our guilt justifies the creation of the law in order to protect; after the law, we are induced to transgress the law, our presumed guilt justifies the creation of the law we serve. the law conditions subjectivization and otherness as caught in a sickened drive to a death by continual mortification. this is how the irruption and welcome of love is political. to give the key that “arises in the very grip of death” (//paul’s new moment// 104).
there is a pain of decentering on the front lines, when against the judgment we seek its overturning. this is the struggle of the first part of our revolution. minds change easily, but the battlements of law are fierce and pervasive and neither they nor their scars turn quickly to dust. the best recovery follows the breath. our salve for wounds is the love-process. we do not love for its health benefits alone, but it is a nice side effect. to invoke an alternate stage: in masada, the defensive line shatters once the offense kills itself. love is, in ontologic sense, a suicide. davis writes this requiem aeternam d/seo, “love is the very process of jettisoning a secure place of power…In sum, love is made love by risking the very possibility of subjectivity” (ibid, 116). the subject metes her demise in face of otherness. the judgment that sought to keep her separate shall not pass.
we can think of the truth event to call us to process our freedom, to usher in disappointment. but the disappointment is not the truth. zizek writes, a “true event emerges out of the “void”…BUT event “dies” with the very exterior gaze (//paul’s new moment// MS 154). But let this dying not presume a Kantian in-itself that is untouched. Through its witness, our testimony and martyrdom, the event is subjectivization–a continual death and resurrection. our truth is in movement.
disappointment is a question of effability, our cosmic game of telephone. “i can never truly express my thought” does not neccessarily lead to “you will never understand what i mean.” we operate in systems of shared space (this is physical and metaphysical). that our epistemology must needs be decentered does not 1) fold to new imposition of right, nor 2) cloak interrelation with defeatism (as though we contend with an unreachable in-itself to communication). it is not an illusion that “like minds” share more intimate space. we can reach and be reached. persisting to decenter, resisting the totem is how we keep the revolutionary moment (our life of grace and resurrection) alive. in spite of disappointment, we are beautifully free. let us awaken to the frustration that is free and in reach.
is rupture like rapture? qua eschatology, zizek asserts, “The naming of the truth-event is “empty” precisely insofar as it refers to the fullness yet to come” (//pnm// MS 147). but this too implies an in-itself, when we really lie beyond. naming fails, as the yet to come is always our emptying. yet kenosis lets impossibility in with a smile. this impossibility, congenially, is in davis’ terms, an “ontology that is always incomplete and yet never nonexistent” (ibid, 33). to let it in is risk, but not from lack; we risk together an inevitably reoccurring process of frustration in regards to our naming in the unfolding impossible. let our smiles be like furrowed brows
//our comimplication//
how can time be ontological, in the sense that the time afforded/accorded one being distinguishes it from an other,
if becoming is time less?
is it possible that our life-force is not one to be explained? like faith, unable to be couched in universals. but i suppose you think this to be avoidance.
an epistemological agency-aphilia is not the only humanism. there is a humanism that relishes the dischordant eruptions and ever-flowing impossibly mapped exigencies of life. of a life that crashes in upon the so-called agent; the agent is in flux always. like the humanism of the poets, who use/intend language it is true, but they are not masters of language (nor dominated by it). the ontological implication of their devilish power is in its interchange with its audience, the verberation and resonance which is always more than an echo. there is accident in craft and interpretation, which can rupture the isolate placidity of narcissus’ pool–i.e. autonomy, intentionality, self-awareness. exigency is from exigere–to drive out, demand. the ontologically exigent aspect of our living demands more than our stories of forethought and hindsight…in other words, our self-authorship. it drives these island-epistemes (even granted island-ontologies) out at the delimitation of debate and decision and act, which ironically are the sites of both radical singularity and complex unification. this is how subjects constitute subjects. impossibly,
agency is epistemic, and enforces the division between decision and act, telling and living. and when is agency not sutured on to existence, when–as sartre argues in //nausea//, “Existence is not something which lets itself be thought from a distance: it must invade you suddenly…”
this is how performance is a tricky play on agency. in the will there is no rehearsal. for examples, consumption, control–these are two sides to the same coin (presumption of given set of options as staging the demonstration of our will, which forces our agency–whatever this be–to atrophy in a post-modern suspicion that overshadows the act itself as ever intentional. intention is a reflection of the master’s discourse, qua moored ego.) far from the manifestation of agency it is often conceived to be, consumerism is instead the cancellation–through deferment–of agency itself. this is how thoughts of agents and their sea lose cogency in the ironical frame of the postmodern outlook–that is, once agency itself is under suspicion as agents subjectivize only by prostituting themselves/turning themselves into slaves with no and limited choice. but, again, let us not confuse the inundation of the lie with the nonexistence of the truth.
meanings, motives are “attached” but not implicit to our behavior. they are an after-thought (post-ontological). now these things bear ontological significance, as they mark us and our living…but are not self-constiutive, autochthonous. we are not born like athena, out of the head of the father-king. beyond hierarchy, (that is, questions about which came first), we can think toward coimplication. true coimplication, intersubjectivity can incorporate the ontological status of both agents and structures separately instantiated, but also ever-woven together in a way that obliterates their delimitation. interpersonal relations are anything but mundane. in this way, interpersonal relations is our key. and they imbibe much more than our auspices of agency (ie otherness in a lawless real).
but agency resists the story as will. our will to act is divergent from our concept of this will’s intention. From Hegel’s discussion of notion and force in //the phenomenology of spirit// para 136., we find that notion sustains difference in thought only, as “vanishing moments” of the universal medium of force. this flow exists unmapped and thus it is our inevitable cartography that bears the cross, the paradoxical selftransformation and selflimitation as moments in flow. that is why we must embrace a wholly/holy relational ontology of structure and agent. together we are not trapped, but vanishing. to a humanism of vanishing moments.
the embrace of impossibility is not an irony. for with irony, one still holds fast to some frame of referential mastery. the deconstructionist presumption that one is denied now what is not present…this furthers the either/or. with complementarity, we get both at the same time. evaluation and discernability–that is, our interpretation of meaning via difference, that one word/concept is NOT another–does not imply space from one to another, but an inbetween. we must muddy the borders. disarm the artillery of the barrage. i perpetually frustrate my desire for me to share “here” with another. but our touching is the very inbetween that throws us past irony and into the fundamentally impossible. bill hicks notes, “fundamentalism is a loss of irony.” i want to treat living and loving fundamentally. without a structure delimiting for me the possible and im-possible. this is the risk to subject if such is only the possibly controlled. for resurrection is not a myth for the self. as in, i resurrect the self. “self’ is already a criminal hung dead upon some cross.
and it is you who is impossible. but this evaluation is not hiding a disappointment.
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- November 5, 2011 / 2:53 pm
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